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NOTE
REIGNING IN ERISA PREEMPTION?
ANY WILLING PROVIDER STATUTES AFIER
NEW YORK BLUE CROSS PLANS v.
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA" or
"the Act")1 is a "comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."2 ERISA
regulates employee benefit plans of private employers,3 impacting the
eighty-eight percent of non-elderly Americans who have private health
insurance through their employee benefit plans.4
Congress passed ERISA in response to widespread mismanagement of
employee benefit plans that placed participants' benefits at risk.5 ERISA
protects participants and their beneficiaries by imposing participation,
funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans.6 ERISA also estab-
lishes "various uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting,
disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension and welfare
plans."
7
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994) [hereinafter ERISA]. ERISA is organized into four titles: Title I - Protection
Of Employee Benefit Rights, Title II - Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Relat-
ing to Retirement Rights, Title III - Jurisdiction, Administration, Enforcement, Joint Pen-
sion Task Force, Etc., and Title IV - Plan Termination Insurance. See 88 Stat. at 829-32
(ERISA table of contents).
2. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
3. ERISA § 4(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)-(b) (defining scope of plans regulated by
ERISA).
4. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993).
5. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) ("[O]wing to the termination of plans before
requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been de-
prived of anticipated benefits."). One instance of plan mismanagement that prompted
Congress to act was the closing of the Studebaker Auto plant in South Bend, Indiana in
1963. The plant closing resulted in the loss of pension benefits by nearly 11,000 employees
who had been employed at the plant. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PEN-
SION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFrr LAW 62-63 (2d ed. 1995).
6. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91.
7. Id. ERISA covers two broad categories of plans, "pension benefit plans" and
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Through enactment of ERISA, Congress sought to replace an assort-
ment of federal labor laws8 and state regulations9 with uniform federal
regulations governing employee benefit plans." To achieve uniformity,
Congress included in ERISA an express preemption provision.1' Section
514(a) of the Act provides that the provisions of Titles I and IV "shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan."' 2 The remainder of section 514
establishes exceptions to the general preemption rule and further clarifies
the scope of ERISA's preemption provisions.'
3
The inherent vagueness of the phrase "relate to" in the preemption
provision is the subject of extensive commentary14 and a key issue in ER-
ISA litigation. The "relate to" test was at the, center of a recent conflict
between the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. This conflict
culminated in the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in New
"welfare benefit plans." ERISA § 3(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2). Pension benefit plans
provide participants with retirement income. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). Welfare
benefit plans provide benefits for health care, legal services, vacation time, or job training.
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
8. See generally William J. Killberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Re-
lating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313,
1313 n.3 (1984) (discussing federal labor laws that imposed operating and reporting re-
quirements on employee benefit plans).
9. See generally James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State
Law Under the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 23, 24-30
(1978) (describing state regulation of employee benefit plans prior to ERISA); Killberg &
Inman, supra note 8, at 1314 n.4 (discussing the development of state regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans).
10. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (addressing the uniform admin-
istration scheme established by ERISA); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
141 (1990) (discussing the "goal of uniformity that Congress sought to implement" through
ERISA).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Preemption means that the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, overrides state legislation because it
cannot be reconciled with federal legislation. See also BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1440 (6th
ed. 1990) (definition of supremacy clause). The use of an express preemption provision
such as 29 U.S.C. § 1144 obviated the application of the implied preemption analysis that
arises under the Supremacy Clause.
12. ERISA § 512(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
13. ERISA § 514(b)-(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)-(d). See also infra notes 35-43 and ac-
companying text.
14. See, e.g., Killberg & Inman, supra note 8, at 1316 n.11 ("Judicial failure to apply
rigorously the text of ERISA's preemption provisions to the facts of particular cases
springs more from inability than from judicial activism. Section 514 appears at first inspec-
tion to provide little guidance in determining whether a state law 'relate[s] to' an employee
benefit plan.")..
9 Reigning in ERISA Preemption?
York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 5
Prior to its decision in Travelers, the Supreme Court relied upon its
statement that a state law "relates to" employee benefit plans, and thus is
preempted by ERISA, if the state law has a "connection with or refer-
ence to"' 6 ERISA plans as the standard for ERISA preemption.' 7 This
standard, nearly as vague on its face as the statutory "relates to" lan-
guage, was easy for courts to apply if a state law specifically referred to
ERISA plans or directly regulated the benefits or administration of ER-
ISA plans. However, courts had difficulty applying this standard in mar-
ginal cases where a state law, challenged under ERISA's preemption
provisions, did not directly affect ERISA plans.".
The breadth of the language of ERISA's preemption provision, 9 and
its similarly broad application by the courts,2" has led commentators2' to
argue that ERISA prevents states from enacting health care reform
measures or measures to pay for health care programs.22
In 1993, Travelers Insurance Company challenged the validity of three
surcharges imposed on them under the New York Public Health Law, 23
alleging that ERISA preempted the surcharges. 24 The surcharges effec-
tively raised the cost of health care to persons using commercial insurers
or self-insured plans, creating an incentive to enroll in the Blue Cross
15. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
16. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
17. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 (declining to decide "where it would be appro-
priate to draw the line" in borderline cases).- See also Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525 n.21 ("ex-
press[ing] no views on the merits of" cases less clear than the one before the Court).
19. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
20. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal
Health Care: A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulat-
ing Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405 (1994).
22. Id. at 410.
23. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1988) (repealed 1993). The
law required that insurance carriers of patients covered by health plans other than Blue
Cross Plans, health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), or government insurance, must
pay a 13% surcharge over the diagnosis-related group ("DRG") rate. Id. The law im-
posed an additional 11% surcharge on DRG rates for patients covered by commercial
health insurance carriers, Id. § 2807-c(11)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1993), and assessed an addi-
tional surcharge of 9% over the DRG rate against HMOs that did not meet a quota of
patients covered by Medicaid. Id. § 2807-c(2-1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993). See infra Part
II.
24. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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plans and to encourage health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") to
enroll additional Medicaid patients.25 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that ERISA preempted the
three surcharges.26 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court.27 The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the surcharges had a sufficient "connection with"
ERISA plans to meet the "relate to" standard for preemption under sec-
tion 514(a) because the surcharges were designed to make certain health
coverage options less appealing for ERISA plans.28
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in Travelers.29 This
Note considers the new standard enunciated by a unanimous Supreme
Court and the impact of the Court's decision on health care reform ef-
forts in state legislatures. This Note assesses the viability of "Any Willing
Provider" ("AWP") statutes in light of the Court's decision. AWP stat-
utes require "managed care" 3° health insurance plans to accept the serv-
ices of any doctor willing to abide by the plan's regulations and fee
schedule. Two cases challenging Arkansas' recently enacted AWP stat-
ute, the Patient Protection Act of 1995,'3 1 are pending in federal district
court.32
Part I analyzes the text and legislative history of ERISA's preemption
provision, and certain key court decisions. Part II discusses the back-
ground and rationale of the New York surcharges at issue in Travelers.
25. Id. at 999-1000.
26. Id. at 999.
27. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993).
28. Id.
29. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
30. Under managed care health plans, beneficiaries:
either see doctors who work directly for a health maintenance organization, or
see independent doctors who are on contract-a setup called a preferred provider
network. Managed care physicians are obligated to keep costs down-for in-
stance, by charging less and not ordering a full battery of tests for patients. In
return, they get more patients.
Lisa Driscoll, Travelers is Drawing Itself a Tortuous Road Map, Bus. WK., Sept. 3, 1990, at
88.
31. 1995 Ark. Acts 505; codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-99-201-209 (Michie Supp.
1995).
32. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Arkansas, No. LR-C-95-514 (E.D. Ark. filed July 27,
1995) (Prudential, lysons Foods, and two labor organizations argue that the AWP statute is
unconstitutional and violates ERISA, the Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act,
and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act); Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield v.
American Med. Int'l, No. LR-C-95-414 (E.D. Ark. filed June 30, 1995) (Arkansas Blue
Cross and Blue Shield contends that the AWP statute is unconstitutional and violates
ERISA).
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Part III addresses the rationale of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in holding that the statutes were preempted by
ERISA, and discusses the resulting conflict with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Part IV analyzes the decision of the
Supreme Court reversing the lower courts and announcing a new stan-
dard for determining whether a state law "relates to" employee benefit
plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision. Part V ad-
dresses the impact of the Court's decision on the litigation that is cur-
rently pending in Arkansas, and on the future of AWP statutes. This
Note concludes that although the Travelers decision appears to remove
ERISA preemption as an obstacle to the imposition of provider taxes to
fund health care programs, and to enact some innovative health care re-
form measures, the Court will need to clarify its decision and revisit the
meaning of ERISA's preemption provision in light of the two current
challenges to Arkansas' AWP statute.
I. ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISION
A. Provisions of Section 514
Section 514 of ERISA33 sets forth the statute's preemption provisions.
Section 514(a) provides that "the provisions of this subchapter and sub-
chapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title."' 34 Section 514(b) 35 exempts from preemption those state laws
33. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
34. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The range of plans regulated by ERISA is
defined as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in sections 201, 301,
and 401, this title shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or
maintained-
(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity af-
fecting commerce; or
(2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or
(3) by both.
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit
plan if -
(1) such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 3(32));
(2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in section 3(33)) with respect to
which no election has been made under section 410(d) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954;
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that "regulate[ ] insurance, banking or securities, ' 36 criminal laws,37 do-
mestic relations orders,38 and other laws that fall within specified statu-
tory guidelines.39 Section 514(c) 41 is a definitional provision.41 Section
514(d)42 addresses the impact of title I's provisions on other federal
laws.43
Challenged state laws that regulate employee benefit plans are not nec-
essarily preempted. However, if a challenged state law is alleged to regu-
late an employee benefit plan that is not of a type specified in section
4(b) of ERISA, the first step in the preemption analysis is to determine
whether the state law "relate[s] to" the plan.44 If a court finds that the
(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applica-
ble workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disa-
bility insurance laws;
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the
benefit of persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens; or
(5) such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in section 3(36)) and is
unfunded.
ERISA § 4(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)-(b).
35. ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b).
36. ERISA § 524(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This subparagraph is commonly
known as the "insurance savings clause" because it preserves the states' power to regulate
the business of insurance free from preemption. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,
57 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 (1985). "The insurance savings clause is meant to rec-
oncile ERISA with the policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act [ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945)
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 - 1015 (1994)] which remits insurance regulation
to the states." LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 5, at 444.
The insurance savings clause is subject to an exception, referred to as the "deemer
clause" of ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), which provides that "no employees benefit plan ... shall
be deemed to be an insurance company.., for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance ...... ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). See,
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 5, at 452-53.
37. ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
38. ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7).
39. ERISA § 514(b)(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(8).
40. ERISA § 514(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c).
41. Section 514(c)(2) defines the term "State" to include "a State, any political subdi-
visions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, di-
rectly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter." ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2). The term "State law" includes
"all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State." ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
42. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
43. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the
United States... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." See Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 375 (1990).
44. See infra notes 61-64, 68 and accompanying text.
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state law "relate[s] to" the plan, the court must then determine whether
the law is saved from preemption by one of ERISA's express exemption
provisions45 laid out in section 514(b). 6 The "insurance savings clause 47
saves from preemption those state laws.that regulate insurance. 48 Even if
the state statute falls within the "insurance savings clause," the "deemer
clause '49 of section 514(b)(2)(B)5 ° nevertheless leads to preemption of
state laws which regulate employee benefit plans because these plans are
not "deemed" to fall within the insurance savings clause.5' Thus, the crit-
ical issues in determining preemption of state law under ERISA are
whether the law "relates to" an employee benefit plan and whether the
state law is saved from preemption because it regulates insurance, bank-
ing, or securities.
B. Legislative History of ERISA's Preemption Provisions
Congress enacted ERISA's preemption provision to provide uniform-
ity in the administration of employee benefit plans.52 Congress sought to
prevent the undermining of ERISA's goals by state legislation affecting
employee benefit plans and to simplify administration of these plans for
multistate employers through the establishment of national regulations.
53
The version of section 51414 that emerged from the Conference Com-
mittee was the most expansive preemption language considered by Con-
45. Killberg & Inman, supra note 8, at 1317-18.
46. ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b).
47. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("[Nlothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regu-
lates insurance, banking, or securities."). See supra note 36.
48. ERISA § 5214(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
49. See supra note 36.
50. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which
is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title . . . nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or ... to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any
state purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment companies.
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
51. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
52. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59-61 (1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mc-
Clendon, 498 U.S. 133, 141-42 (1990).
53. Senator Williams, Chairperson of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
stated that ERISA would "preempt the field for'Federal regulations, thus eliminating the
threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans."
120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974).
54. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
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gress during the legislative consideration of ERISA.55 Other proposed
versions of section 514 considered by Congress limited preemption to
state laws containing subject matter actually regulated by ERISA.56 Both
the expansive preemption language enacted by Congress57 that originated
in the Conference Committee58 and the legislative history of ERISA59
have led to a broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause. The
broad language of Section 514 enacted by Congress provides the context
for a discussion of ERISA's preemption provision because courts decid-
ing ERISA preemption cases rely on its breadth to support a broad appli-
cation of the provision to preempt state law.
C. ERISA's Preemption of State Law
The Supreme Court's decisions in ERISA preemption cases indicate
four ways a "state law" may "relate to" an employee benefit plan within
the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision and, therefore, be subject
to preemption:60 (1) a direct conflict may exist between the provisions of
ERISA and the provisions of the state law;61 (2) the state law may make
reference to an employee benefit plan;62 (3) the state law, without any
55. See Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative
Problems and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 47, 50 (1988).
56. See id. at 48-52 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the Conference Com-
mittee's deliberations regarding ERISA's preemption provision).
57. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
58. See Schaffer & Fox, supra note 55, at 48-52.
59. See supra note 53 (discussing the comments of Senator Williams). See also com-
ments of Representative Dent, Chairman of House Labor and Education Committee, 120
CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (characterizing ERISA § 514 as "the reservation to Federal au-
thority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans").
60. See Kevin Matz, ERISA's Preemption of State Tax Laws, 61 FORDHAM L. REv.
401, 409 n.56-59 (1992).
61. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981). Alessi, the
Supreme Court's first ERISA preemption decision, has been described as "the prototype
of 'substantive' or 'content conflict' preemption." LANoBEIN & WOLK, supra note 5, at
427. In Alessi, the Court struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited a method of
computing a plan participant's pension benefits in a manner specifically authorized by ER-
ISA. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524.
62. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61-62 (1988) ("Pennsylvania's an-
tisubrogation law has [included] a 'reference' to benefit plans governed by ERISA."); In-
gersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 140 ("Texas' cause of action [is preempted by ERISA
because it] makes specific reference to, and indeed is premised on, the existence of a pen-
sion plan."); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) ("The
Georgia statute at issue here expressly refers to-indeed, solely applies to-ERISA em-
ployee benefit plans."). In these three illustrative cases, the Court based its decision, that
an explicit reference to an ERISA plan falls within the scope of the "relate to" language of
§ 514(a), upon its earlier pronouncement in Shaw: "A law 'relates to' an employee benefit
1996] Reigning in ERISA Preemption? 273
reference to an employee benefit plan or any conflict with ERISA, none-
theless may have been intended by the legislature to affect ERISA
plans;63 and (4) the state law may produce an indirect effect on an em-
ployee benefit plan substantial enough to warrant preemption.64 The
Supreme Court has explained that: "A state law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan."-65 Courts have relied upon this language as
the test for preemption of a state law.66
plan in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58-59; Ingersoll-Rand, 498
U.S. at 139; Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
63. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61. The Court's statement in FMC Corp. that "[s]tate
laws directed toward the [employee benefit] plans are preempted because they relate to an
employee benefit plan," id., apparently provides a broader scope of preemption than ap-
plied to the first two types of state laws preempted under § 514(a). See supra notes 60-61.
An example of this third type of state law would be a state law enacted with the purpose of
affecting the costs of employee benefit plans. See Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 134,
139-40 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985) (New York statute that precluded
self-insured employee benefit plans from negotiating discount rates with hospitals was not
preempted by ERISA because no evidence was introduced in Rebaldo that the state legis-
lature intended to impair employee benefit plans). The Second Circuit later retreated from
this decision. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing refusal of Second Cir-
cuit to follow Rebaldo in a later decision).
64. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 59-60. Using the "connection with" language of Shaw,
463 U.S. at 96-97, see infra note 65 and accompanying text, the Court preempted a Penn-
sylvania anti-subrogation law, finding that the. law both made reference to, and had a con-
nection with, an ERISA covered plan. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 59-60. Holding that the
state law had a "connection with" an employee benefit plan, the Court, citing Shaw, noted
that "[i]n the past, [it had] not hesitated to apply ERISA's pre-emption clause to state laws
that risk subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state regulations." Id. at 59. The
Court also noted that "[t]o require plan providers to design their programs in an environ-
ment of differing state regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide
plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits." Id. at
60 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987)). According to the
Court, "[a]pplication of differing state subrogation laws ... frustrate plan administrators'
continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide." Id. In the eyes of
the Court, this result would run counter to ERISA's goals of uniformity of administration
for plan administrators and would be an indirect effect on the administration of the plan.
Id.
65. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
66. E.g., Belshd v. Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal., 876 F. Supp.
216, 219 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Employers Resource Management Co., Inc. v. James, 853 F.
Supp. 920, 927 (E.D. Va. 1994); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 1002
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Richards v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 804 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (D. Minn.
1992); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 807 F. Supp. 1501, 1503 (D. Haw. 1992), afj'd, 12 F.3d
1498 (9th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Amax Coal Corp., 748 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Utah 1990);
Mid America Hotel Corp. v. Bernstein, 664 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. I11. 1987); Baker v. Kaiser
Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
274 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:265
While the Court has applied the broad language of section 514(a) to
preempt a wide variety of state laws,67 "the preemption clause is neither
absolute nor indiscriminate."'68 For example, the Court has held that ER-
ISA does not preempt state-mandated benefit regulation,69 criminal
law, 70 severance pay at plant closings, 71 and garnishment of.ERISA wel-
fare benefit plans. 72 Generally, state laws that are not preempted by ER-
ISA are those regulating areas traditionally left by Congress to the
states,73 which have only an incidental effect on ERISA regulated plans.74
II. NEW YORK'S REGULATION OF HOSPITAL RATES
A. Background
Until the 1960's, New York did not regulate prices charged to insurers
by hospitals for patient care. Rather, hospitals generally negotiated rates
with Blue Cross plans that were less than their published rates. Hospitals
accepted the lower rate, known as the "charge differential," because Blue
Cross plans paid their bills promptly and served an important community
purpose by providing a health coverage option, to the less fortunate.75
By the late 1970's, federal and state laws regulated the rates charged to
patients covered by programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross
plans, and HMOs. To preserve the revenues of these plans, hospital rates
for patients covered by unregulated payors were as much as twenty-five
to forty percent higher than those charged to regulated payors.76
In 1983, New York enacted a hospital rate reimbursement system that
established rates paid by all payors. Under the 1983 law, hospitals billed
patients covered by Medicaid, Medicare, HMOs, and Blue Cross plans
the same rate. Hospitals were required to bill all other patients at uni-
67. See supra notes 61-64.
68. Holloway, supra note 21, at 421 (citing David L. Gregory, ERISA Law in the
Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 945, 957-64 (1991)).
69. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 728-31, 758 (1985).
70. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112 (1989). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4)
(1994) ("Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal
law of a State.").
71. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987).
72. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 840 (1988).
73. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 740-42.
74. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830-38 (discussing the effects of different state laws on
ERISA plans).
75. Brief of Petitioner Mario M. Cuomo, et al., New York Conference of Blue Cross
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995), at 2 [hereinafter Brief of Mario M.
Cuomo].
76. Id. at 2.
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form rates not exceeding 115% of the Blue Cross rate.77 This regulation
of hospital rates reduced charges to "charge payors" T by eight to eight-
een percent.79
New York justified the statutory imposition of the "charge differential"
on both economic and social policy grounds:
Charge differentials in favor of Blue Cross and HMOs are justi-
fied by cost savings to hospitals and positive social policy out-
comes. The principal cost savings accrue from prompt payment
which provides working capital to hospitals and saves them
money by reducing collection costs. The positive social policy
outcomes include insurance coverage practices, most notably
open enrollment and community rating, which make health in-
surance more available."0
Thus, New York made no secret of the fact that it was intentionally in-
creasing the rates of certain health insurance plans to make the Blue
Cross plans more competitive.
B. The Challenged Provisions of New York Public Health Law
§ 2807-c
In 1988, New York enacted a prospective reimbursement system to set
hospital rates.8" The system relies upon a case payment methodology by
which hospital patients are placed in categories known as a diagnosis-
related group ("DRG"). The rate charged by the hospital is based on the
DRG, not the actual cost of providing the patient's treatment. The DRG
rate is increased by a "payor factor" which accounts for differences in
health coverage and costs to the hospital of providing care to a given
patient.8 2
The 1988 statute required insurance carriers, other than the Blue Cross
plans, HMO's, or any government insurance plan, to pay a thirteen per-
77. Id. at 2-3.




81. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807 (McKinney Supp. 1995). See also Brief of Mario
M. Cuomo, supra note 75, at 4 (discussing enactment of New York's hospital rate setting
system).
82. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Paul R.
Koster, Note, Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala: The Illogical Restriction of Medi-
care's Funding of Graduate Medical Education, .12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 269,
275-76 (1995) (discussing Medicare's Prospective Payment System, which also reimburses
providers based on pre-scheduled rates for services rendered).
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cent surcharge above the DRG rate.83 This differential was meant to con-
tain hospital costs and increase availability of health insurance to New
York residents unable to afford other health insurance. 4 The goal of the
surcharge was to level the playing field for the Blue Cross plans enabling
them to attract more customers, including employee benefit plans regu-
lated by ERISA.s5
In 1992, New York imposed two additional surcharges. The first was an
additional eleven percent charge on the DRG payment rates charged to
patients covered by commercial health insurance carriers.86 The second
surcharge added a nine percent assessment on HMOs that failed to enroll
a minimum number of Medicaid eligible persons.87 The hospitals kept
the proceeds of the original thirteen percent surcharge to help contain
costs, while the proceeds of the eleven percent surcharge were paid into
the state's general fund. HMOs paid the nine percent surcharge directly
to a designated HMO "pool," which was also ultimately deposited into
the state's general fund.88
As the Second Circuit observed:
The obvious effect of the 11% surcharge is to increase commer-
cial insurers' costs of providing health care, thus making them
less competitive with the Blues. Unlike the 11% surcharge,
however, the primary purpose of the 9% assessment is to en-
courage HMOs to enroll Medicaid recipients, thereby lowering
the costs of the Medicaid program. 9
Because different employee benefit plans provide health insurance to em-
ployees through different types of health insurance plans,9" the rates paid
by ERISA plans were affected by each of the three surcharges.
83. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b).
84. Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 712.
85. Id
86. 1992 N.Y. Laws, ch. 55, § 348 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2807-c(11)(i)).
87. 1992 N.Y. Laws, ch. 55, § 346 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2807-c(2-a)(a)).
88. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
89. Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 712.
90. ERISA plans provide health insurance through the purchase of commercial health
insurance, self-insurance, subscription to an HMO, and coverage through non-profit health
service corporations such as the Blue Cross Plans. Id. at 711.
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III. NEW YORK BLUE CROSS PLANS V. TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.
A. Objections to the New York Statutory Scheme
Travelers Insurance Company and The Health Insurance Association
of America challenged the statutes, alleging that the surcharges were pre-
empted by ERISA's preemption provision.91 The New York State
Health Maintenance Organization Conference intervened as a plaintiff,
while the New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Plans, Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield ("the Blues"), and the Hospi-
tal Association of New York State intervened as defendants. 92
B. Decision of the District Court
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that "the three statutory provisions at issue are all preempted by
ERISA,"93 and therefore invalidated the surcharges. 94 Relying upon the
statement of the United States Supreme Court that a law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan "in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a con-
nection with or reference to such a plan, '95 as well as the legislative his-
tory of ERISA's preemption provision96 and the decisions of other
courts,9 7 the district court found that a broad reading of the preemption
provision was required.98 The district court, however, acknowledged the
limits of ERISA's preemption provision99 before analyzing whether the
New York surcharges were preempted by ERISA.
According to the district court, "[a]lthough the 9%, 11% and 13%
Surcharges do not expressly refer to ERISA plans, it is clear that those
statutes have a 'connection with' such plans."'" The district court ac-
91. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 999.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The surcharges were also challenged as preempted under the Federal Employee
Health Benefits Act, id.; Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 714-17, and as violative of the Tax
Injunction Act. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1000-01. These issues were not consid-
ered by the Supreme Court. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1675.
95. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1002 (quoting Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)). See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 1002; See also supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the legis-
lative history of ERISA's preemption provision).
97. The district court specifically cited the First Circuit's statement that the legislative
history "counsels against a crabbed interpretation of the statute." McCoy v. Massachusetts
Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 916 (1992).
98. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1002.
99. Id. at 1003.
100. Id.
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knowledged that "the Surcharges do not directly increase a plan's costs or
affect the level of benefits to be offered."'' 1 However, because the
surcharges would be passed along to ERISA plans, the surcharges "lead,
at least indirectly, to an increase in plan costs."'" This "indirect" connec-
tion with employee benefit plans regulated by ERISA was sufficient to
trigger preemption. The district court also placed great emphasis on the
fact that this result is the goal of the surcharges-to increase the costs of
commercial health insurance plans and HMOs-thereby encouraging en-
rollment in Blue Cross Plans.'03
The district court rejected the defendants' argument that the
surcharges should not be considered as "relating to" employee benefit
plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision. According
to the district court, the surcharges "do not impact the structure or ad-
ministration of employee benefit plans, impose requirements on use of
plan resources, or impose inconsistent obligations upon multi-state
plans,"' 014 which was the purpose of including the preemption provision in
the legislation.' 5 Even under this analysis the surcharges would be pre-
empted because the surcharges burden commercial insurers and HMOs
that provide services to employee benefit plans. Therefore, "those
Surcharges may effect the structure and/or administration of such
plans.' 1 6 Because the cost increases caused by the surcharges are passed
on to the plans, the plan administrators may adjust the benefits they pro-
vide employees rather than pass the costs on to employees.' 0 7 This result
would burden plan administration in a way ERISA was enacted to
avoid.' 0 8
The State of New York and the Blues relied on-Rebaldo v. Cuomo,109 a
decision in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-.
cuit held that an earlier version of New York's rate setting statute, giving
Blue Cross Plans a discount off the DRG rate, was not preempted by
ERISA.1 0 In Rebaldo, the Second Circuit held that "'a state law must
purport[ ] to regulate ... the terms and conditions of employee benefit
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. See also supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
104. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1004.
105. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
106. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1004.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
110. Id. at 139.
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plans' to fall within the preemption provision.""' Moreover, the Second
Circuit found that "if ERISA is held to invalidate every State action that
may increase the cost of operating employee benefit plans, those plans
will be permitted a charmed existence that never was contemplated by
Congress." '112 Thus, New York and the Blues argued that an indirect ef-
fect on hospital rates should not automatically bring about ERISA
preemption.
The district court did not follow Rebaldo because it determined that
the case had "been abrogated by later Supreme Court cases." 113 It
pointed out that the Second Circuit previously recognized the Supreme
Court's rejection of this limitation of ERISA preemption.114 Despite
agreeing that a broad reading of the ERISA preemption provisions may
bring about the undesirable result of preemption in all marginal cases, the
Second Circuit found this result to be the consequence of the broad pre-
emption language." 5
The district court analyzed whether the surcharges were saved by the
insurance savings clause. 16 To avoid preemption under the insurance
savings clause, a court must determine that the state law not only impacts
on the insurance industry, but also that the law is "specifically directed
toward that industry.""' 7  Additionally, the court must determine
whether the law regulates a practice which constitutes the business of in-
surance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act." 8 The Act establishes the
following criteria: "[f]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transfer-
ring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the in-
sured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the in-
surance industry."1 9
The district court found that the surcharges did not "regulate insur-
ance" within the meaning of the insurance savings clause because HMOs
and self-insured plans do not engage in the business of insurance as a
111. Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 138-39.
113. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1005.
114. Id. (citing Smith, 959 F.2d at 9 n.3 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McLendon, 498
U.S. 133, 141 (1990))).
115. Id. at 1006.
116. Id. at 1006-07.
117. Id. at 1006 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987); Howard v.
Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir. 1990)).
118. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48-49.
119. Id. (quoting Union Labor.Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
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matter of law. 120 Thus, the nine percent surcharge and the portions of the
thirteen percent surcharge relating to self-insured plans do not qualify as
"regulating insurance.' ' 121 Additionally, because the goal of both the
eleven percent surcharge and the thirteen percent surcharge is to regulate
hospital rates, neither of these surcharges qualify as "regulating
insurance.'
122
Applying the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors, 23 the district court
found that, while the eleven percent surcharge and the thirteen percent
surcharge spread the cost of insuring high risk individuals, 24 neither of
the surcharges relate directly to the relationship between the insurer and
the insured, nor are they limited to the insurance industry. 25 Accord-
ingly, the district court held that the surcharges were preempted by ER-
ISA and not saved from preemption by the insurance savings clause. 26
C. Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The State of New York and the Blue Cross Plans appealed the district
court's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit also held that the surcharges were preempted by ERISA.' 27 The
Second Circuit acknowledged the breadth of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion, as well as its limits.'
28
New York and the Blue Cross Plans argued that the district court erred
in concluding that the indirect impact of the surcharges was substantial
and impermissibly affected the administration or type of benefits fur-
nished by a plan. 129 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that
the surcharges satisfied the less stringent "connection with" standard an-
120. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1007 (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,
60 (1988)) (Self-funded ERISA plans "are exempt from state regulation insofar as that
regulation 'relate[s] to' the plans."); O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir.
1990) (holding that HMOs "do[ I not engage[ ] in the business of insurance for the pur-
poses of ERISA"); McManus v. Travelers Health Network of Tex., 742 F. Supp. 377, 382
n.5 (W.D. Tex. 1990) ("Because the Texas 'HMO Act' is not 'specifically directed' at the
insurance industry, it does not fall within the scope of the ERISA savings clause.").
121. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1007.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
124. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1007-08.
125. Id. at 1008.
126. Id.
127. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1993).
128. Id. at 718-19.
129. Id. at 719.
Reigning in ERISA Preemption?
nounced in Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon.130 According to the Second
Circuit, by making some health coverage options more expensive, and
therefore less attractive, to ERISA plans, "the surcharges purposely in-
terfere with the choices that ERISA plans make for health care cover-
age," thereby constituting a sufficient "connection with" ERISA plans to
trigger preemption. 131 Because the surcharges "force ERISA plans to in-
crease either plan costs or reduce plan benefits,' 32 the "connection with"
standard is met.133 The Second Circuit also upheld the district court's
determination that the surcharges were not saved by the insurance sav-
ings clause.' 34
Defendants relied on Rebaldo to support their arguments on appeal.
The Second Circuit, however, adopted the district court's view that the
premise of Rebaldo was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Second Cir-
cuit also rejected defendants' contention that ERISA's preemptive effect
is limited to those laws that purport to regulate employee benefit
plans.'
35
D. Conflict with the Third Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged 136 that its holding conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision in
United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Me-
morial Hospital.'37 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey
statute which imposed surcharges on DRG rates, the proceeds of which
reimbursed hospitals for providing uncompensated and Medicare serv-
ices. The statute also granted discounts to certain classes of payors.1
38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
statute did not "relate to" employee benefit plans in a way that impli-
cated ERISA's preemption provisions. 39 Additionally, the Third Circuit
found that the connection between the statute and the ERISA plans was
too tenuous and remote "[b]ecause [they were] dealing with a statute of
general applicability that is designed to establish the prices to be paid for
130. 1d
131. Id.
132. Id. at 720.
133. Id.
134. Id at 721-22.
135. Id. at 719.
136. Id at 721 n.3.
137. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
138. Id. at 1189-90.
139. Id. at 1191.
19961
282 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:265
hospital services, which does not single out ERISA plans for special treat-
ment, and which functions without regard to the existence of such
plans."' 40 The statute's "indirect ultimate effect of increasing plan costs"
removed the statute from the scope of ERISA preemption.141 The-Third
Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt the statute. 42 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari 143 to resolve the conflict between the circuits.
144
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In an opinion written by Justice Souter, a unanimous Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Second Circuit.145 As an initial matter, the
Court reviewed the congressional intent in drafting section 514 to estab-
lish the appropriate breadth of the provision. 146 Justice Souter acknowl-
edged the expansive language of section 514(a), noting that "one might
be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether the words of limitation
('insofar as they ... relate') do much limiting."' 47 He also pointed out
that if the phrase "relate to" were applied to its broadest possible mean-
ing, Congress' words of limitation would be "a mere sham.' 48 Further,
such an interpretation would "read the [general] presumption against
pre-emption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with
generality.'
149
Following this preliminary analysis of section 514(a), the Court ac-
knowledged that its prior explanations of the phrase "relate to" were
"[not] much help" in deciding the case.' 50 As did the district court and
the Second Circuit, the Court followed its holding in Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines '5 that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
140. Id. at 1192.
141. Id. at 1193-95.
142. Id. at 1191.
143. New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 305 (1994).
144. New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995).
145. Id. at 1673, 1676.
146. Id. at 1677. Justice Souter reiterated the Court's general principle that when a
federal law is said to preempt state action in an area traditionally regulated by the states,
the Court works on the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Id. at 1676 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).




151. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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plan.' 15 2 The Court dismissed the "makes reference to" standard as a
basis for preemption of the surcharges because the surcharges were im-
posed on patients and HMOs regardless of whether the coverage was se-
cured by an ERISA plan and because employee benefit plans are not
mentioned in the statute.'5 3
A. Reworking the "Connection with" Prong of the "Relate to" Test for
Preemption under ERISA Section 514
The Court analyzed whether New York's challenged surcharge
scheme 5 4 had a "connection with" ERISA plans.155 Because a literal
application of the phrase "connection with" would be equally unhelpful
as the literal application of the phrase "relate to," the Court looked to the
objectives and legislative history of ERISA to determine "the scope of
the state law that Congress understood would survive." '56 Initially, Jus-
tice Souter noted that the Supreme Court had consistently accepted con-
gressional intent to "establish the regulation of employee welfare benefit
plans 'as exclusively a federal concern."" 57 Relying on its earlier findings
regarding congressional intent, 5 s as well as the floor statements of two of
the congressional sponsors of ERISA, 159 the Court determined that
"[t]he basic thrust of the pre-emption clause then was to avoid a multi-
plicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administra-
tion of employee benefit plans."' 6 °
According to Justice Souter, this principle is illustrated by analyzing the
Court's decisions in Shaw,161 FMC Corp. v. Holliday,62 and Alessi v.
152. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1677 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
155. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
158. See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). In Ingersoll-Rand, the
Court found that with the passage of section 514(a) Congress intended:
to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of
complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the
Federal Government ... [and to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive
law... requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities
of the law of each jurisdiction.
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142.
159. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1677. See also supra notes 52, 58 and accompanying
text.
160. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1677-78.
161. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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Raybestos-Manhattan Inc.1 6 3 "In each of these cases, ERISA preempted
state laws that mandated employee benefit structures or their
administration."
164
In Shaw, the Court held that state laws "which prohibit[ ] employers
from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discrimi-
nates on the basis of pregnancy, and.., which require[ ] employers to pay
employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate to' benefit plans.' ' 165 Because
varying benefits when the laws might apply, or requiring plans to provide
every beneficiary with benefits established by state law if the law required
the benefits for any beneficiary, ERISA preempted the challenged
statute. 66
In Holliday, the Court held that ERISA preempted a state law that
prohibited "plans from being structured in a manner requiring reimburse-
ment in the event of recovery from a third party" and "require[d] plan
providers to calculate uniform benefit levels in Pennsylvania based on
expected liability conditions that differ from those in States that have not
enacted similar antisubrogation legislation," thus "frustrat[ing] plan ad-
ministrators' continuing obligation to calculate benefit levels nation-
wide.' 1 67 Essentially, this law entitled employees who had recovered
against tortfeasors to be "entitled to benefits in excess of what plan ad-
ministrators intended to provide, and in excess of what the plan provided
to employers in other States.'
' 61
In Alessi, the Court held that a State law could not "prohibit plans
from setting workers' compensation plans off against employees' retire-
ment benefits or pensions because doing so would prevent plans from
using a method of calculating benefits permitted by federal law."'
1 69
For the Court, the charge differentials ought not trigger preemption
under ERISA because unlike the statutes at issue in these three cases, the
charge differentials were justified on the basis of the Blue Cross Plans'
efficient payment to hospitals 7 ° and the coverage of individuals who are
less likely to obtain health insurance from commercial insurers or
162. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
163. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
164. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
165. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
166. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
167. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60.
168. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
169. Id. (discussing the Court's holding in Alessi).
170. Id.
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HMOs."' Acknowledging that "their effects flow from their pur-
pose," '172 the Court accepted that the surcharges make the Blue Cross
Plans "more attractive (or less unattractive) as insurance alternatives" '73
for ERISA plans.
The Court qualified the impact of New York's surcharges on ERISA
plans as "[a]n indirect economic influence" on the decisions of insurance
purchasers, including ERISA plans. 74 However, this "indirect influence"
on ERISA plans did not "function as a regulation of an ERISA plan it-
self"175 because the surcharges did not bind the decisions of ERISA plan
-administrators. 76 Similarly, the surcharges did not affect the uniform ad-
ministration of ERISA plans because they affected only the cost of the
plan, not the administration of, or benefits provided by, a given employee
benefit plan.
177
The Court also acknowledged numerous examples of state laws with
so-called indirect economic influences which could affect a plan's costs.
178
State regulation of quality standards and employment conditions, if not
applied uniformly to all aspects of hospital activities, might impact the
costs of services paid by plans, constituting an indirect economic effect on
the plans.' 79 Although these indirect economic effects may have less of
an impact on the premiums charged, and costs paid, by employee benefit
plans than the challenged surcharges, Justice Souter pointed out that "in
the absence of a more exact guide to intended pre-emption than 514, it is
fair to conclude that mandates for rate differentials would not be pre-
empted unless other regulation with indirect effects on plan costs would
be superseded as well."' 8 ° Without reading some limit on the scope of
preemption into section 514, the limiting language would be effectively
"read out" of the statute. Such a conclusion would violate basic rules of
statutory interpretation and be incompatible with the Court's position
171. Id. For the Court, the Blues' open enrollment policy was a particularly important
rationale for the charge differential. Id. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text
(discussing open enrollment).




176. Id. For Justice Souter it was readily apparent that "commercial insurers and
HMOs may still offer more attractive packages than the Blues." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. The Second Circuit rejected this argument. Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 719-
21.
180. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
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that "[p]reemption does not occur... if the state law has only a tenuous,
remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans, as is the case with
many laws of general applicability."'' State laws such as New York's,
that create an indirect economic effect on employee benefit plans, leave
plan administrators with the same responsibility to find the best insurance
value for plan beneficiaries. Such state laws are not the types of "con-
flicting directive[s]" Congress sought to avoid with the implementation of
ERISA. 182 Accordingly, the Court held that a state law with such an "in-
direct economic effect" did not have the requisite "connection with" ER-
ISA plans to bring about preemption under section 514 of ERISA.
83
B. Support for the "Indirect Economic Effect" Test
1. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
The Court further relied on its decision in Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency184 to support its distinction between direct and indirect effects on
ERISA plans. In Mackey, the Court held that ERISA's preemption pro-
vision did not prevent a general state garnishment statute from applying
to participants' benefits held by an ERISA plan. 8 5 ERISA's preemption
language indicated that "Congress did not intend to forbid the use of
state-law mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare
benefit plans, even those mechanisms prevent plan participants from re-
ceiving their benefits."' 86 Thus, "[i]f a law authorizing an indirect source
of administrative cost is not pre-empted, it should follow that a law oper-
ating as an indirect source of merely economic influence on administra-
tive decisions, as here, should not suffice to trigger pre-emption
either.' ,
187
2. Rejection of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts
The commercial insurers which opposed the New York surcharges ar-
gued that the Court's decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Mas-
sachusetts, 88 where the Court relied on ERISA to strike down a law
181. Id. at 1679 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd, of Trade, 113 S. Ct.
580, 583 n.1 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
182. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
183. Id.
184. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
185. Id. at 840.
186. Id. at.831-32.
187. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
188. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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mandating coverage of certain minimum mental health care benefits, re-
quired that the New York surcharges also be struck down. 189 In Metro-
politan Life, the Court determined that the policies regulated by the New
York statute included those bought by employee welfare benefit plans
and therefore "directly affected" such plans. 190 Although the Court de-
termined that the state law at issue in Metropolitan Life was saved from
preemption by the insurance savings clause,191 the commercial insurers in
Travelers relied on the Court's. initial determination of a direct effect in
arguing that "all laws affecting ERISA plans through their impact on in-
surance policies 'relate to' such plans and are pre-empted unless ex-
pressly saved by the statute."' 92
Rejecting this argument, the Court differentiated the two statutes be-
cause the challenged statute in Metropolitan Life made express reference
to employee benefit plans. 193 The Court also noted that in Metropolitan
Life there was no need to distinguish between the effects of state laws
regulating insurers that are sufficiently "connected with" employee bene-
fits plans to "relate to" the plans and those effects that are not.194 The
Court noted that in Metropolitan Life, the challenged state law related to
employee benefit plans because it bore "'indirectly but substantially on
all insured benefit plans, . . . requir[ing] them to purchase the mental-
health benefits specified in the statute when they purchase a certain kind
of common insurance policy."" 95 Even in Metropolitan Life, however,
the Court acknowledged that laws that "regulate only the insurer, or the
way in which it may sell insurance,"' 96 do not "relate to" employee bene-
fit plans.
Based on the Court's reasoning in Metropolitan Life, the basic tax ex-
emption enjoyed by the Blue Cross Plans in New York "since the days
long before ERISA" do not relate to employee benefit plans. 197 The
New York surcharges did not place the same substantive coverage re-
189. Id. at 727.
190. Id. at 739.
191. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). See also supra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text (discussing the insurance savings clause).
'192. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
193. Id. at 1680-1681 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 730-31).
194. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1681.
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 741.
197. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1681 (citing Theodore R. Marmor, New York's Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, 1934-1990: The Complicated Politics of Nonprofit Regulation, 16 J.
HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & L. 761, 769 (1991)) (tracing the special tax treatment of the
Blue Cross plans back to 1934).
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quirements on plan administrators as did the challenged law in Metropoli-
tan Life.'9 8 Some surcharges could leave plan administrators with a
"Hobson's choice,"'199 requiring them to contract with the Blues. The
challenged surcharges, however, were not preempted because they "[did]
not require plans to deal with only one insurer, or to insure against an
entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave without
coverage.
20 0
3. A New Understanding of the Legislative History of ERISA
Justice Souter looked beyond the language of section 514 and state-
ments of key members of Congress to determine congressional intent re-
garding ERISA's preemption provision. He relied on two additional
historical facts to reject a broader interpretation of "relate to" that would
bar any state regulation of hospital costs. 20 1 First, the DRG scheme ,202
even without the challenged surcharges, would be preempted under the
broader understanding of ERISA's preemption provisions.20 3 According
to Justice Souter, this result would be "startling" because several states,
including New York, regulated hospital rates at the time ERISA was
passed by Congress. 2 4 Further, the absence of any discussion regarding
elimination of state regulation of hospital rates in ERISA's legislative his-
tory indicated that Congress did not intend to end state regulation of hos-
pital costs.
20 5
Second, the same session of Congress that adopted ERISA also
adopted the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974 ("NHPRDA") 20 6 just months later.20 7 The purpose of the
NHPRDA was to encourage and fund state responses to growing health
care costs. 20 8 As a part of the program, the federal government would
198. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1681.
199. Id. A Hobson's choice is a choice between taking what is offered and taking noth-
ing. OXFORD MODERN ENGLISH DICrIONARY 504 (1992).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
203. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1681.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
§§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 2225, 2225-27 (1975), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701(a), 100 Stat.
3743, 3799 (1986).
207. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1681-82.
208. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act § 2, 88 Stat. at 2226-
27.
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assist state agencies in regulating health care costs by promulgating "[a]
uniform system for calculating rates to be charged to health insurers and
other health institutions payors by health service institutions."2 9 Requir-
ing such federal assistance for state regulation of health care costs would
be incompatible with preemption of these same rates by ERISA.21 °
Thus, the broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption provision urged
by those challenging the New York scheme would have "rendered the
entire NHPRDA utterly nugatory, since it would have left States without
the authority to do just what Congress was expressly trying to induce
them to do by enacting the NHPRDA.",211 The fact that the same session
of Congress passed both ERISA and NHPRDA indicates that Congress
did not intend such a broad reading of ERISA's preemption provisions.
This is the case because under the broader understanding of the "relate
to" language, the programs anticipated by the NHPRDA would be pre-
empted.212 This provides further support of a narrower understanding of
the "relate to" test.
D. Express Limitation of the Court's Holding
Without any qualification or limitation of the Court's decision, it is ap-
parent that states would have nearly unlimited authority to pass laws that
impact employee benefit plans regulated by ERISA without fear of pre-
emption, so long as the effect on employee benefit plans is an "indirect
economic effect" not bearing directly on the administration of, or benefits
provided by, the plan. However, the Court placed an express caveat in its
decision:
we do not hold today that ERISA pre-empts only direct regula-
tion of ERISA plans, nor could we do that with fidelity to the
views expressed in our prior opinions on the matter. We ac-
knowledge that a state law might produce such acute, albeit in-
direct, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage
or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state
law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514.213
Thus, despite the Court's unanimous decision, this limitation leaves ques-
tions as to the extent of ERISA preemption on statutes with indirect ef-
209. 88 Stat. at 2254.
210. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1682.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1683 (citations omitted).
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fects on employee benefit plans, and the impact of preemption on state
regulation of health care.
V. CAN ANY-WILLING-PROVIDER LAWS SURVIVE
AN ERISA CHALLENGE IN LIGHT OF
NEw YORK BLUE CRoss PLANS V. TRA VELERS INSURANCE CO. ?
A. Background
As employers have looked for ways to minimize the growing costs of
providing health insurance to employees, managed care has become an
increasingly popular and prevalent mode of providing health insurance.
In managed care, insurance companies establish provider networks such
as HMOs or Preferred Provider Networks ("PPOs"). Under managed
care plans, insurance companies "save money by steering patients to se-
lected doctors who agree to accept discounted fees and by reducing the
use of specialists. "
214
Critics of managed care argue that HMOs reduce costs at the expense
of quality medical care. Proponents of managed care argue that without
limits, doctors "milk[ ] money from patients and insurers by giving unnec-
essary or inappropriate care. '215
As enrollment in managed care plans proliferate, so do the concerns of
providers excluded from these plans. The excluded doctors, in an effort
to keep their patients (and their income), have encouraged legislators to
enact legislation to require managed care plans to accept any doctor will-
ing to provide services to a patient within the guidelines and fee schedule
of the managed care plan. Some form of this AWP legislation, often
termed "Patient Protection Acts," was enacted in five states in 1995,
while twenty-five others rejected these measures.
216
Lobbying efforts surrounding these bills have been intense.217 On one
side are doctors excluded from managed care networks who argue that
HMOs limit patient choice and lower the quality of care by limiting the
patient's choice of doctors to a pre-approved list. Predictably, managed
care plans, as well as some employers andunions, oppose these measures,
214. Judith Havemann, HMO's, Doctors Battle in State Legislatures Over Managed Care
Limits, WASH. POST, August 22, 1995, at A4.
215. Michael Pretzer, Do Any-Willing-Provider Laws Really Help Doctors?, MED.
ECON., March 13, 1995, at 108.
216. Havemann, supra note 214, at A4.
217. See, e.g., Karen McAllister, Unions, Businesses Join Hands to Test Any-Willing-
Provider Law, ARi,. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, July 28, 1995, at B1.
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arguing that the only way to guarantee quality and limit costs is to choose
the providers with whom they contract.
B. Arkansas' Patient Protection Act of 1995
Arkansas' Patient Protection Act of 1995218 is among the strongest
AWP legislation in the country.219 The statute includes findings of the
legislature that patients "should be given the opportunity to see the
health care provider of their choice.""22 To accomplish these goals, the
Patient Protection Act prohibits insurers from charging fees or higher co-
payments, or imposing any incentive or disincentive for plan participants
from seeing certain doctors instead of others. 221 Further, the law imposes
civil penalties, including injunctive relief for an aggrieved doctor, and
fines of not less than $1,000.222
C. Pending Litigation in Federal Court
Opponents of the Arkansas legislation did not stop their fight upon
218. 1995 Ark. Acts 505, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-201-209 (Michie Supp.
1995).
219. Havemann, supra note 214, at A4.
220. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-202.
221. Id. § 23-99-204. That section provides:
(a) A health care insurer shall not, directly or indirectly:
(1)(A) Impose a monetary advantage or penalty under a health benefit plan
that would affect a beneficiary's choice among those health care providers
who participate in the health benefit plan according to the terms offered.
(B) Monetary advantage or penalty includes:
(i) A higher copayment;
(ii) A reduction in reimbursement for services; or
(iii) Promotion of one (1) health care provider over another by these
methods;...
(2) Impose upon a beneficiary any copayment, fee or condition that is not
equally imposed upon all beneficiaries in the same benefit category, class, or
copayment level under that health benefit plan when the beneficiary is receiv-
ing services from a participating health care provider pursuant to that health
benefit plan; or
(3) Prohibit or limit a health care provider that is qualified... and is willing
to accept the health benefit plan's operating terms and conditions, schedule
of fees, covered expenses, and utilization regulations and quality standards,
from the opportunity to participate in that plan.
(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent a health benefit plan from instituting
measures designed to maintain quality and to control costs, including, but not
limited to, the utilization of a gatekeeper system, as long as such measures are
imposed equally on all providers in the same class.
222. Id. § 23-99-207.
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passage of the statute. Since the enactment of the Arkansas law, two
lawsuits were filed in federal district court challenging the law.223 Both of
these suits rely on the argument that the AWP legislation is preempted by
ERISA and therefore should be struck down. z2 4
D. Issues Affecting the Outcome of the Pending Litigation
In determining whether Arkansas' Patient Protection Act is preempted
by ERISA, the district court, and possibly the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court, will be asked to determine whether the statute is pre-
empted by section 514 of ERISA. The first step is to analyze whether the
statute "relates to" ERISA protected plans within the meaning of section
514.225 This analysis will rely on the reasoning of Travelers, which clari-
fied the test laid out in Shaw. Under Shaw, the test was whether there is
a "reference to" or "connection with" the ERISA plan.226 Travelers
modified the analysis of whether a state law has a "connection with" an
ERISA plan by asking whether the law brought about an indirect eco-
nomic effect that merely affected the rates charged by plans, not the
choices made by plan administrators.227 However, the Travelers decision
is not carte blanche for states to enact any regulation with an indirect
economic effect on ERISA plans. Rather, if the economic effect is so
acute as to effectively force certain decisions of plan administrators, the
law may nonetheless be preempted.228
Turning to the treatment of AWP statutes generally, and the Arkansas
Patient Protection Act specifically, under ERISA's preemption provision,
and in light of Travelers, the issue for a court faced with an ERISA pre-
emption problem is whether the AWP statute restricts the choices of ER-
ISA plans as to their organization, structure, and administration. If the
AWP has no such impact, then the economic effect of the statute must be
223. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Arkansas, No. LR-C-95-514 (E.D. Ark. filed July
27, 1995) (Prudential, Tysons Foods, and two labor organizations argue that the law is
unconstitutional and violates ERISA, the Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act
and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act); Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield v.
American Med. Int'l, No. LR-C-95-414 (E.D. Ark. filed June 30, 1995) (Arkansas Blue
Cross and Blue Shield contend that the law is unconstitutional and violates ERISA).
224. See State Defendants Dismissed From Suit Challenging Any-Willing-Provider Law,
23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 3 at 161 (Jan. 15, 1996).
225. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
226. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). See also supra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text.
227. New York Conference of Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671,
1679-80 (1995).
228. Id. at 1683.
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assessed. If so, the preemption determination focuses on whether the ef-
fect is so acute as to warrant preemption.
After analyzing the Court's decision in Travelers, the basic arguments
for each side in the Arkansas litigation are easy to anticipate. Proponents
of the statute will argue that the AWP statute does not mandate benefits,
impose new plan regulations, or affect the uniform administration of ER-
ISA plans. As with the surcharges in Travelers, the AWP statutes leave
plan administrators with the same responsibility to find the best insurance
value for plan beneficiaries.22 9
Opponents of the statutes will argue that, like the statute at issue in
Metropolitan Life,2 3° AWP statutes directly regulate the decisions of plans
and plan administrators as to which doctors will be able to participate in
providing health coverage to plan beneficiaries. Thus, AWP statutes are
more than a mere "indirect economic effect" on ERISA plans; they actu-
ally dictate the decisions of plan administrators as to doctors, preventing
plans from regulating quality or costs by picking and choosing among
doctors. Additionally, AWP statutes stifle the "gatekeeper" function of
managed care plans by which these plans guide beneficiaries to certain
providers in order to limit costs and maintain quality.
In Cigna Healthplan v. State of Louisiana,23' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted the AWP pro-
visions of Louisiana's Health Care Cost Containment Act.232 The Louisi-
ana statute prohibited preferred provider networks which contract with
"group purchasers" of health care services from excluding a licensed pro-
vider of health care services from any network of preferred providers.233
The statute specifically included ERISA plans in the definition of "group
purchasers., 234 According to the opinion in Cigna, because the Louisiana
229. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1680. See also supra notes 193-96 and accompany-
ing text.
230. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
231. 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
232. Id. at 644-45 (holding that ERISA preempted LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2201-02
(West 1992)).
233. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(c). No licensed provider, other than a hospital,
who agrees to the terms and conditions of the preferred provider contract shall be denied
the right to become a preferred provider to offer health services within the limits of his
license. Id.
Under the statute, the preferred provider organizations are defined as "contractual ...
agreements between a provider or providers and a group purchaser or purchasers to pro-
vide for alternative rates of payment .... Id. at 40:2202(5).
234. Id. § 40:2202(3). According to the Louisiana Health Care Cost Control Act:
"Group purchaser" shall mean an organization or entity which contracts with
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statute specifically mentioned ERISA plans and affected employee bene-
fit plans, ERISA preempted the statute.235
According to the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court's decision in Travel-
ers did not change this result, reading that case as saving from preemption
only those statutes with an indirect economic effect on the prices of insur-
ance policies purchased by ERISA plans.236 Under this analysis, the fact
that the Louisiana AWP statute affected the nature and structure of the
benefits provided by ERISA plans, and not merely the price of these ben-
efits, the Travelers analysis did not prevent preemption.237 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit applied a very literal and limited reading of the Supreme Court's
ERISA preemption cases and Travelers to hold Louisiana's AWP statute
preempted by ERISA.
The decision in Cigna will be of precedential value in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, where the litigation
over the Arkansas Patient Protection Act is pending. However, the two
statutes can be differentiated in at least one important respect. The Loui-
siana statute made specific reference to ERISA plans,238 while the Pa-
tient Protection Act regulates health plans generally.239 Thus, the Patient
providers for the purpose of establishing a preferred provider organization.
"Group purchaser" may include:
(a) Entities which contract for the benefit of their insured[sic], employees, or
members of such as insurers, self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts, or
employers who establish or participate in self-funded trusts or programs.
(b) Entities which serve as brokers for the formation of such contracts, including
health care financiers, third party administrators, providers, or other
intermediaries.
Id. This definition specifically includes ERISA plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1994)
(defining an employee welfare benefit plan as "any plan, fund, or program which ... is ...
maintained by an employer . . . to the extent that such plan, fund, or program ...is
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants... medical... care or benefits
235. Cigna Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 648-49.
236. Id. at 649.
237. According to the Fifth Circuit:
Louisiana's Any Willing Provider statute specifically mandates that certain bene-
fits available to ERISA plans must be constructed in a particular manner. In
other words, the Louisiana statute does not merely raise the cost of implicated
benefits; it dictates their very structure. As such, the statute falls outside the pur-
view of the limited Travelers holding: The Court there repeatedly recognized that
ERISA preempts "state laws that mandat[e] employee benefit structures."
Id. (quoting New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1678 (1995)).
238. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(3).
239. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-204(a) (Michie Supp. 1995) (prohibiting "health care
insurer" from placing any monetary incentive or penalty that would affect the choice to
receive health care from a provider willing to abide by the plan's rules and regulations).
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Provider Act is more a regulation that affects plan prices than one which
singles out ERISA plans and affects the structure of benefits. This factor
reduces the likelihood that the Patient Protection Act would be con-
strued -as having such an acute effect on ERISA plan administrators as to
warrant preemption. Under the statute, all health insurance plans would
be subject to the AWP statute, whether managed care or traditional fee-
for-service plans.24° Further, the statute provides explicitly that it does
not regulate the benefits or guidelines of a given plan.24' Accordingly, in
light of Travelers, even if the Patient Protection Act were to raise the cost
of HMO coverage to ERISA plans, the statute would not be preempted
because the effect of the statute is not so acute as to bind the decisions of
the plan administrators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following the Court's decision in New York Blue Cross v. Travelers In-
surance Co., commentators were divided over the practical impact of the
ruling.242 Employee benefit consultants and commercial insurers were
generally concerned that states would read the decision as an opportunity
to impose new provider taxes, regulations, or other indirect assessments
on employee benefit plans. 243  However, organizations representing
states and state insurance commissions, as well as advocates of compre-
hensive health care reform, praised the decision as preserving states' abil-
ities to control their own health care systems. 2 " From a practical
The term "health care insurer" is defined as "any entity, including, but not limited to: (1)
Insurance Companies; (2) Hospital and medical services corporations; (3) Health mainte-
nance organizations; (4) Preferred provider organizations; (5) Physician hospital organiza-
tions; (6) Third party administrators; and (7) Prescription benefit management companies;
authorized to administer, offer, or provide health benefit plans." Id. § 23-99-203(f).
240. Id. § 23-99-203(f)(1-7).
241. Id. § 23-99-205.
242. See Scott Falk, Experts Divided over Impact of U.S. Supreme Court ERISA Deci-
sion, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 23 at 1348 (June 5, 1995).
243. Id. Bill Gradison, President of the Health Insurance Association of America, re-
marked that "[i]n effect, [the people of New York] 'are being asked to subsidize the Blues."
Supreme Court Says ERISA Doesn't Preempt Surcharge on Insurers, FED. & STATE INS.
WEEK (May 1, 1995) No. 18 Vol. 9. The Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans
was "deeply concerned" by the decision and indicated that "[ojne thing seems certain:
several states will now presumably enact a variety of laws that will impose new cost bur-
dens on plan sponsors." U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to State Surcharges on Hos-
pital Bills, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 18 at 1129 (May 1, 1995).
244. According to Lee Douglass, the President of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, the decision recognized "that states have the right to treat the purchases of
health care coverage differently, in terms of hospital rates." Supreme Court Says ERISA
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standpoint, though, two courts quickly followed the Court's lead and up-
held state laws imposing surcharges similar to those at issue in Travelers.
Safeco Life Insurance Co. v. Muller2 45 and Boyle v. Anderson246 relied
upon the decision in New York Blue Cross Plans to uphold state laws
assessing additional costs on ERISA plans.247 In each of these cases the
courts of appeal found that the state law at issue constituted an indirect
economic effect under the Court's decision in Travelers.2 48 Accordingly,
the trend in the lower federal courts after New York Blue Cross Plans
seems to be to uphold statutes, such as provider taxes, that merely impose
an indirect economic effect on ERISA regulated employee benefit plans.
Thus, as states consider provider taxes to fund health care programs,
taxes or surcharges on employee benefit plans may now be enacted by
state legislatures without threat of ERISA preemption.249 While it re-
mains to be seen whether states will actually turn to provider taxes as a
source of revenue to support health care programs, in light of the Travel-
ers decision, there is little doubt that such laws will be upheld.
Doesn't Preempt Surcharge on Insurers, FED. & ST. INS. WEEK (May 1, 1995) No. 18 Vol. 9.
Douglass went on to argue that states need to control their health care system "includ[ing]
having the ability to make health plans that do not pay their fair share contribute to the
cost of the health care system. This applies to self-funded as well as traditional insurers
and HMO's." Id.
Similarly, Daniel Sisto, President of the Healthcare Association of New York, praised
the decision. "[This decision] means that states such as New York ... can continue to
reform their health care delivery systems to meet the needs of all persons." U.S. Supreme
Court Rejects Challenge to State Surcharges on Hospital Bills, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA)
No.18 at 1129 (May 1, 1995).
245. 65 F.3d. 647 (7th Cir. 1995). In Safeco, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin's Health Insurance Risk Savings Plan, which imposes
assessments on insurance policies, including ERISA plan policies, to fund major medical
insurance for eligible uninsured. Id. at 648-50.
246. 68 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 1995). In Boyle, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit upheld the Minnesota Health Right Act, which funds several programs to
make health insurance available to more Minnesota citizens through a two percent tax on
the gross patient revenues of hospitals, a two percent tax on the gross revenues of non-
hospital health care providers, a cigarette tax increase, and other taxes. Id. at 1097-98. The
Minnesota law allows providers to transfer the cost of the tax to third party purchasers,
including insurance companies, HMOs, or self-insured employee benefit plans. Id. at 1098.
247. Safeco, 65 F.3d at 652-54 (following the Court's "pragmatic" approach in Travelers
decision); Boyle, 68 F.3d at 1109-10 (applying rationale of the Court in Travelers).
248. Id.
249. Id. According to Trish Riley, Executive Director of the National Academy for
State Health Policy, a provider tax could be one of the few options available to states to
offset potential loses from Medicaid cuts. Similarly, some employee benefits consultants
have indicated that should block grants replace current Medicaid funding formulas, some
states will be forced to examine alternative financing options such as provider taxes. Falk,
supra note 242, at 348-49.
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In New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. the Supreme
Court clearly announced a much more specific standard for section 514's
"relate to" language that would result in preemption of state laws with
indirect effects on ERISA plans. The fact that the decision was unani-
mous, a rarity given the composition of the current Court, indicates that
the Court as a whole is willing to give states leeway to enact health care
reform programs. Given such unanimity, it is difficult to envision a state
law with no reference to employee benefit plans and with only indirect
economic effects on employee benefit plans that would create acute ef-
fects on the administration of employee benefit plans so as to compel a
majority of the Court to rule the state law preempted.
Lower courts are already giving states wide latitude to impose provider
taxes that affect employee benefit plans,250 and it seems unlikely that ER-
ISA preemption will be an obstacle to future state health care reform
efforts such as AWP statutes when the statutes are tailored to the Travel-
ers standard.
Theodore Einhorn
250. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text (discussing decisions of the United
States Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, each relying on New York
Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. to uphold state imposed taxes on health care
providers against ERISA preemption challenges).
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